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Introduction: 
It is over a decade since South Africa’s leading mining companies first rolled out an HIV 
treatment and well being program for its employees. With sero-prevalence at South Africa’s 
mines estimated at over 20 percent, HIV management has become the object of the most 
intensive exercise of corporate social responsibility (CSR). This essay focuses on HIV/AIDS 
management at Anglo American—the world’s third biggest mining company, largest private 
sector employer in South Africa and across the continent, and the first company to provide 
antiretroviral therapy (ART) “free of charge” to their workforce in a context of little or no 
access to state healthcare.  
Through the lens of HIV management, I consider what happens when fundamental 
human care and welfare is refracted through the prism of corporate managerialism, 
shareholder value, and, more immediately, the relationship between workers and capital. 
Relations between employer and employee are being transformed as a result of corporate 
healthcare programs, creating connections between the personal realm of sexual conduct and 
family life, and the political economy of global corporate capitalism. Recently, 
anthropologists have become increasingly interested in neoliberal regimes of care and 
pharmaceutical governance (see for example Ecks 2007; Petryna et al 2006). However, 
research has focused on the subjects of such regimes and the new kinds of “therapeutic 
citizenship” they create (Biehl 2007: 73), neglecting the actual apparatus of corporate care as 
key components of welfare on which this essay concentrates. Here, I chronicle Anglo 
American’s HIV intervention. I track the dispensation of corporate care from the boardrooms 
of its London and Johannesburg command centers to the platinum mines and labor hostels of 
South Africa’s North West Province. In 2003 Anglo Platinum established its HIV prevention 
and wellness program under the banner “Circle of Hope,” describing its strategic approach as 
one underpinned by a combination of “economic impact containment” and “compassion” 
(Anglo Platinum 2003a). 
In South Africa, the state rollout of ART was long in coming, blocked by denialism at 
the highest levels of government at a time when ART was most needed. When a national 
ART initiative was finally announced in 2002, it was slow and uneven (Thornton 2008). Over 
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a decade later, while South Africa now hosts the largest ART rollout in the world it remains 
patchy, with striking disparities in service provision across the nation’s provinces while rural 
areas remain drastically underserved. As a result only around half of those who need 
antiretrovirals are thought to be currently getting them (UNAIDS 2012). Within the mining 
industry, where HIV prevalence is higher than the national average, pressure to respond to the 
HIV crisis has been further compounded by debates surrounding the migratory labor system. 
As Campbell’s study makes clear, “the life situation of migrant workers... renders them 
particularly vulnerable to HIV” (1997: 273). Thus, the epidemiology of the pandemic has 
been determined, in part, by the political economy of migrancy upon which the mining 
industry continues to depend (Williams et al 2002). 
The elevation of Anglo American and its cohort of mining multinationals should be 
viewed within a broader market-based paradigm of development which promises to harness 
the reach and resources of big business in the service of global health crises and to supersede 
the economic, political or bureaucratic impotence of state healthcare systems (Rajak 2011). 
Under the banner of CSR, this movement has gained increasing currency within the 
development arena. The discourse of CSR asserts an unassailable rationale for intervention: 
HIV poses an urgent threat to human capital for labor-intensive businesses operating in 
southern Africa. Underlying this rationale is the promise of a confluence of efficient business 
and caring corporation which combines moral imperatives with, as Mauss put it, “the cold 
reasoning of the business, banker or capitalist” (Mauss 1967: 73). 
Corporate systems of HIV management thus aim (or claim) to offer both a new ethic 
of care while also mitigating the economic impact of the epidemic on the financial bottom-
line of the company. In this particular dispensation of corporate welfare we find the discourse 
of shareholder value fused with moralities of social responsibility. Corporate reporting on 
HIV has become part of complex actuarial calculations measuring the costs of HIV treatment 
against the losses incurred through sickness, injury, and fatality, for each ounce of platinum 
produced. Such actuarial calculations attempt to take uncertainties (or in corporate speak, 
“externalities”) at the mines—underground injuries, absenteeism due to illness, loss of 
“human capital”—and turn them into calculable certainties for investors in London. Fearnley, 
for example, estimated that HIV treatment would reduce the value of production at Anglo 
Platinum by 10%, whereas ‘doing nothing’ would reduce the value of production by 
approximately 23% (Fearnley 2005: 146).   Thus the volatile and uncertain capital markets 
are intimately connected to corporate regimes of welfare, which attempt to manage a very 
different set of uncertainties at the mines. As such, calculations attempt to make worker 
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welfare amenable to the kind of predictive logics that turn uncertainties into certain outcomes 
in order to insulate the company from the fickle fears of investors. This is part of a much 
older program of scenario forecasting within Anglo American dating back to the latter years 
of apartheid when the company controlled around 50 percent of the South African economy 
(Lester et al 2000: 188). Surveying the post-apartheid future the company’s team of horizon 
scanners and scenario planners attempted to provide a set of principles, a playbook as it were, 
for predicting and controlling the uncertain future (and sustaining their influence and wealth 
within it). According to these principles, business, indeed all of life, is best strategized as a 
game—much like the classic model of market rationality—complete with rules, players, 
winners, and losers. Today, the biggest “game” being played in South Africa, according to 
the company’s chief forecaster, is HIV: “a catastrophic game,” which, as he put it, combines 
“human tragedy with cold economics.” 
* * * * * 
In 2004 when I started my research on the platinum belt, mining companies were 
riding high on soaring global metals prices. The Financial Times reported: “mining 
companies are generating so much cash at the moment due to high metals prices that it 
sometimes appears hard for them to know how to spend it” (Bream 2006). At the centre of the 
platinum boom, was Rustenburg, the source of around half of the world’s platinum. At the 
same time, the CSR movement was gaining ground daily, building momentum globally, and 
finding particular currency in South Africa as it incorporated the language of Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) promising emancipation and social improvement through 
business, big and small. In South Africa, multinational corporations, with the mining industry 
at their helm, were lining up (or competing) to commit their resources, their know-how and 
their creative energies to social goods, from community education and empowerment 
initiatives, to HIV care and treatment programs. 
As it turns out, CSR offered much more to companies than something to spend their 
own money on. It proved equally lucrative for them - enabling mining companies to leverage 
international donor funds, demonstrating the extent to which CSR in general was emerging as 
the new orthodoxy of development. In particular, the South African mining industry was 
being embraced as partner in building the new South Africa. In 2007 the International 
Finance Corporation gave Lonmin (owners of the Marikana mine) $5.9 million in technical 
assistance to upgrade worker housing and promote BEE, among other things (Lichtenstein 
2012). 
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Meanwhile in 2013, Anglo Zimele, Anglo American’s empowerment arm which 
enables them to comply with BEE legislation, received funding from the Development Bank 
of South Africa, i.e. the state development bank, in order to support BEE start-ups 
(empowerment work which is construed as a demonstration of the corporate effort to “give 
back” to the nation). That same year, the UN Global Fund apportioned 80 percent of its 
country budget to fight malaria in Ghana, to Anglo Gold Ashanti (ICMM press release 
20141), effectively channelling the bulk of Global Fund programming in the country to mine-
affected areas while leaving a dearth elsewhere. Each of these cases represents the investment 
of public or donor funds and technical assistance to cover core operational costs such as 
worker health and housing which are nonetheless categorised as “externalities” in corporate 
speak. CSR, I argue, serves as a mechanism by which companies offload the financial 
burdens of their social obligations rather than internalizing them. This foreshadows a critical 
tension between responsibility and externalization that runs through this essay. 
Four years on from the boom time of investment in minerals and social responsibility, 
and the picture looked very differently. Anglo American announced a 69 percent decline in 
profits to $1bn for the first half of the year (Smith 2009). By the end of the year 11 percent of 
its global workforce was laid off in order to make up the $450 million in costs (Sparshott 
2009). A large proportion of the 19,000 retrenched Anglo employees were at Anglo Platinum 
which, according to trade unions, was responsible for a fifth of all recession-linked formal 
sector job losses in South Africa (Smith 2009). This amounts to ten thousand or so former 
employees at the platinum mines who were no longer eligible for company-sponsored ART 
or other benefits offered as part of the company’s CSR to its workforce. In such a context of 
mass joblessness, “those with jobs,” as Gumede puts it, “cling on to them, for fear they may 
never get one again” (Gumede 2012). Yet they are all the more vulnerable to the dictates of a 
volatile global market and the shibboleth of shareholder value invoked by corporate 
management as a rejoinder to their struggle for better conditions and a fairer wage. Cast as a 
facet of CSR, worker welfare is thus linked to shareholder value, contingent on the extreme 
vacillations in price to which the platinum market is subject (from $2000 an ounce in 2006 to 
$800 an ounce in 2008). 
This essay is divided into four sections which explore both the kinds of control that 
are enabled through the corporate dispensation of worker welfare; the spatial and temporal 
limits to that exercise of responsibility; and the inequalities that these acts of delimitation and 
externalisation produce. 
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In the first section I consider how worker welfare becomes a basis for governance; not 
the self-governance of corporations as is commonly expected, but governance of the 
workforce. As welfare is conflated with the maintenance of human capital, care becomes a 
conduit for corporate control giving new force to old paternalistic and repressive regimes of 
labor management which the advent of contemporary CSR had supposedly consigned to the 
past. From sport and leisure, to health and hygiene, and from safe sex to “feeding” science, 
HIV management is embedded within daily regimes that attempt to regulate the working and 
domestic lives of employees. 
The second section moves on to consider the geographic demarcation of corporate 
responsibility. I examine how the new technologies of HIV management reinscribe 
boundaries demarcating the company’s zone of responsibility, erecting a metaphysical 
“cordon-sanitaire” between the workplace and, what is described in corporate jargon as, “the 
world beyond our perimeter fence” (Anglo American 2005: 16). Through the daily routines 
of HIV management, the company attempts to “make legible its subjects” (Scott 1998: 2) and 
to protect the social fabric of its workforce—its human capital—from the physical infection, 
“moral contagion,” and threat to productivity, brought on by “outsiders.”  
Section three explores how this spatialization of CSR creates liminal spaces between 
the company and what the WHO has termed “peri-mining communities”. As increasing 
numbers of mineworkers opt to live outside the hostels—mostly in the informal settlements 
which sit cheek-by-jowl with the mining compounds—the distinction between workplace and 
society becomes increasingly anachronistic. Yet, I argue, it is the very permeability of the 
physical borders (across which movement was once more rigidly controlled) that has placed 
increasing importance on symbolic “moral” borders re-constructed, rather than dissolved, 
through the authoritarian benevolence of corporate care. Through the re-inscription of these 
borders the tension between welfare and profit emerges clearly. 
As the final section of this essay shows, the circumscription of CSR not only imposes 
spatial boundaries, but it also establishes sharp temporal limits to welfare provision. 
Measured against metrics of productivity, the corporate care program has become 
increasingly efficient at managing and maintaining the well being of mineworkers while they 
remain employed by the company. However, there are no reliable statistics accounting for 
health and well being of workers once they leave the company (whether due to sickness, 
sacking, or shaft closure). And while the state delivery of ART remains patchy and slow, 
especially in the traditional “labor-sending” areas to which many mineworkers return after 
their contracts are terminated, doctors at the mines remain pessimistic about whether a 
  
6 
continuum of care across the mine’s perimeter is possible, let alone likely. The result is the 
emergence of a vanguard or island of ART recipients, employees who depend on the mine 
not only for their livelihoods, but also for their survival. They are thus divided from society 
outside the workplace and from their own dependents. Their liminality comes to embody the 
disjuncture between corporate responsibility and state welfare which translates into an 
awkward topography of authority and responsibility. 
 
 
Human Care and Human Capital 
In Anglo’s 1987 forecasting, HIV had been identified as a “wild card” in the broader 
game of socio-economic transition (Sunter 1987). This prediction was underwritten by a 
survey of 60,000 mineworkers conducted by the Chamber of Mines between 1986-7 showing 
0.3 percent HIV prevalence among South African miners. The highest prevalence (around 4 
percent) was among Malawian mineworkers (Randera 2003). In response, the mining 
industry introduced pre-emptive testing for all foreign mineworkers: “no known carriers will 
be engaged [and] all recruits from high risk areas will be tested at source” (Brink and 
Clausen 1987: 15, emphasis added). Such a response effectively externalised HIV as an 
extraneous risk encroaching on the borders of the workplace. Mining companies attempted to 
insulate themselves against this “threat” to productivity and profit by cutting off the supply of 
labour, and supposedly the infection, “at source.” 
The genealogy of this strategy can be traced back over half a century to apartheid 
discourse from the 1940s, perpetuated by the mine medical establishment and the 
government, located the source of tuberculosis epidemics at the mines in the physical and 
moral failure of mineworkers to make the transition from rural life in the homelands to 
industrial civilization at the mines or, as Packard puts it, from “healthy reserve” to “dressed 
native” (Packard 1989: 686).  Such pseudo-scientific claims provided support for the policy 
of “separate development” between the areas designated “native homelands” or “bantustans” 
by the apartheid government and the state.  The tenure of black mineworkers within the 
boundaries of the workplace was determined by their objectification as a productive resource. 
Mamdani writes: “this meant, on the one hand the forced removal of those marked 
unproductive so they may be pushed out of white areas back into native homelands and, on 
the other, the forced straddling of those deemed productive between workplace and homeland 
through an ongoing cycle of annual migrations” (Mamdani 1996: 7). The realities of 
impoverishment in the homelands, of households fragmented through migrant labor, and of 
  
7 
the poor conditions of work and life at the mines, were glossed into an idealised myth of the 
“healthy reserve,” to which mineworkers were expected to return when their contracts ended 
(Packard 1989: 11). Such narratives externalized responsibility for both the cause and cost of 
occupational ill-health and welfare from employer to employee.  
The industry’s initial response after the 1986 HIV survey followed this same logic. 
Just as mine medical officers in the 1940s had pursued a policy of swift “repatriation” of TB 
infected mineworkers once they became “unable to function” (Packard 1989: 692), so in 
1987, the Chamber of Mines instituted a similar policy for HIV positive miners. An article 
appeared in the Journal of the Mine Medical Officers’ Association qualifying the industry’s 
position: despite pre-emptive testing (which was later outlawed), mineworkers would not be 
“repatriated” if they were well enough to work, but would face “repatriation” when they 
became too sick to do so (Brink and Clausen 1987). 
In 2002 when the company launched its wellness program, the Chairman explained, 
“this is… not just a humanitarian mission; it is good business practice” (Interview with Sir 
Mark Moody-Smith, Anglo American London, 6 December 2005). The logic of enlightened 
self-interest (as CSR is often dubbed) focuses on countering loss to profit wrought by HIV, 
costed in terms of increased absenteeism, accidents due to impaired physical or cognitive 
function and loss of manpower in order to provide “economic risk assessment model(s)” for 
the investment in ART. The company’s 2008 annual Report to Society costs its care program 
follows: 
Total monthly savings at an individual level were... calculated to be $219... the cost of 
providing treatment was $126, giving a net saving of $93 per month at an individual 
level...  The overall impact of HIV/AIDS on the Group... was calculated at 3.4% of 
payroll (Anglo American 2008: 34). 
These actuarial logics sustain a broader narrative of “shareholder value” that apparently 
provides proof of a bottom line to corporate humanitarianism. From this conflation of human 
care with human capital an unsettling combination of health-speak and accountancy-speak 
emerge which reduce the human “cost” of HIV to a ratio of payroll (in this case 3.4 percent). 
An Anglo executive explained: “look the bottom line is… if you spend thousands of dollars 
training someone to drive a truck and they then die of AIDS, you have to train someone else” 
(Interview with Anglo American executive, London 9 August 2004).  By rendering social 
responsibility as a facet of shareholder value, HIV management can be distilled into 
productive outputs to provide apparently irrefutable evidence of efficiency. This was borne 
out in my discussion with Dr Matthew Waywell, a senior Anglo executive, during which he 
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presented the cases of the Goedehoop colliery and the Rustenburg platinum mines, and the 
respective success and failure of the HIV intervention at each: 
The manager at Goedehoop moved there about 18 months ago and said, “how’s the 
AIDS programme going?” They said, “5% have been tested.” He said, “this is 
pathetic”... They went from 5% to 92% uptake of VCT in 2004. They have a 
workforce of 1177. 90% of these were tested, that’s 1059 employees and 22 others. 
Of these 191 are HIV positive (that’s 18%). Of the 191, 176 have enrolled in the 
wellness programme and the other 15 are thinking about it. Of those, 65 are on ART, 
and of those 63 are at work. That was 2004, now it’s 2005 and he’s reset the clock: 
“now we start again with VCT.” Last time I saw him he said, “Doc, we’re up to 100% 
VCT uptake”... Anglo Coal puts VCT targets into managers’ performance ratings. 
They measure their VCT uptake day by day. I can call him—I’ll call him now and say 
“what is your VCT uptake for today?” (Interview with Dr Matthew Waywell2, Anglo 
American Johannesburg, 2 June). 
Waywell then turned to Rustenburg: 
What you see there is a lack of commitment, lack of leadership… At Anglo Platinum 
they claim that HIV is 25% in their report, it should be 35%. Why don’t they know? 
Those section managers in Anglo Platinum need to be held accountable. Someone 
should put a rocket up their arse. 
Waywell’s recitation of the numbers tripped off his tongue, well-rehearsed after 
frequent interviews and public engagements. The same numbers were recited to me in 
interviews with executives in London and were presented at CSR conventions, compelling in 
their ability to demonstrate measurable success of the company’s HIV interventions in terms 
of a quantifiable output. Such metrics of efficiency (the numbers of workers in VCT, on 
ART, and back at work) impose a profit and loss logic which did not go uncontested within 
the company. For those such as Bridget Kessler and Elias Makoe, who worked on the 
“social” as opposed to the “medical” side of HIV planning within Anglo subsidiaries, the 
preoccupation with “numbers,” as Kessler put it, was indicative both of the technocratic and 
production-focused culture of mining companies, and the dominance of a traditionally 
biomedical approach to worker health: 
The whole HIV issue has been melted down to two figures—how many workers have 
had VCT and how many are on ART. We have meetings with our counterparts in 
London, and that’s what we discuss—the numbers! How many people are infected, 
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how many are in VCT, how many are on ART.  (Interview with Bridget Kessler, HIV 
coordinator, Anglo Platinum Johannesburg, 1 May 2005). 
The friction surrounding this preoccupation with figures for VCT and ART was 
equally revealing of a tension between the narrow focus on protecting the company’s human 
capital and the broader moral mission of “taking a stand on HIV”, as Anglo executives 
commonly put it. “Does anyone care about anything other than that?” Kessler asked, “and 
when I say ‘anyone’, I mean the decision makers.” Indeed, this demand for empirical proof of 
the efficiency of the HIV intervention is operationalized in much the same way as production 
targets, though without the same incentives and penalties if an operational manager fails to 
meet a target: 
It’s the process of internal competition—beating up the laggards. If, as a business 
unit, you read in the annual report that 90% of the company is successful at this—it 
could be production, it could be getting workers into VCT—and you’re in the 10 
percent… you feel the peer pressure... People in business are essentially 
competitive—nobody wants to be the dragging tail (Interview with Sir Mark Moody-
Stuart, Chairman, Anglo American, London 6 December 2005).  
As Moody-Stuart’s statement indicates, the elevation of multinationals in the fight against 
HIV (celebrated by bodies such as the UN and WHO) goes beyond a question of delivery. As 
he underlines, it is the extension of market logic itself into the realm of worker healthcare 
(and public health more broadly) that is fast becoming orthodoxy. 
Yet the notion of “enlightened self-interest”—which instrumentalizes CSR as a 
mechanism to safeguard human capital—recalls a much older logic. As Marks reminds us, 
“concern for the lives and limbs of... workers” is far from new (Marks 2006: 570).  Health 
management in the workplace traditionally combined a paternalistic ethos with a Taylorist 
order which attempted to maintain living labor capacity by eliminating threats to low output 
(Crisp 1983: 104). This logic found concrete expression in the establishment of the Ernest 
Oppenheimer hospital at the Welkom gold mines in the 1950s; a model of both modern 
medicine and progressive mine management, according to its first director, Dr JHG 
Blommestein: 
This was an era in which there still survived an idée fixe… that workers were just 
hands… that expenditure not directly relevant to profit must be kept at a minimum. 
However, the winds of change blew… directors and managers began to realize that 
every day lost by a sick or injured man adds to the cost of production (van 
Blommestein 1971: 100). 
  
10 
Over three decades later Dr. McAllister, at the Anglo Platinum hospital in Rustenburg, 
described a similar shift from labor battery to responsible corporation with the advent of the 
HIV Wellness program: 
Occupational health used to be just about being “fit for work”—a rubber stamp… If 
someone couldn’t work, you got rid of them and got another... fatalities were 
budgeted for (Interview with Dr McAllister, Anglo Platinum Rustenburg Hospital 25 
April 2005). 
According to McAllister the new socially responsible company no longer “budgets for 
fatalities.” Yet, as discussed above, the contemporary discourse of enlightened self-interest 
relies on just such a set of, albeit more sophisticated and compassionate, actuarial 
calculations now cast in the language of shareholder value. Welfare framed within the logic 
of corporate responsibility is thus articulated as managing and minimizing risks to 
shareholders. With a simplicity that seemed both irrefutable and reminiscent of van 
Blommestein, the chairman of Anglo American affirmed the synergy of responsibility and 
productivity in his address to the Leadership Conference on Global Corporate Citizenship in 
New York, January 29, 2009: “healthy workers are more productive”.  
By presenting risk and responsibility as two sides of the same coin, the dominant 
corporate discourse serves to externalize HIV as a social risk or threat to profit from which 
business must insulate itself.  Executives stressed that while the company offered a solution 
to the crisis in the areas where they operate, the source of the problem lay outside the 
company’s domain of the company, extraneous to the business of mining. The chairman 
explained: “there are also things in the country happening which have an impact on the 
operations, such as... crime, HIV… conflict, things which are not caused by the company but 
impinge on it… This is not our fault, but we’re getting zapped by it” (Interview with Anglo 
American Chairman, London 6 December 2005).  As I explore in the following section, this 
tension between externalization and responsibility plays out in the routines of care and the 
demarcation of moral space around the mines, delimiting the boundaries of corporate 
responsibility to their zone of interest: the workplace and the workforce. 
 
Geographies of Care and Control 
As Steyn, hostel coordinator at Anglo Platinum’s Rustenburg Section, was to insist the 
hostels are much changed from those described by Wilson as “labour batteries” (Wilson 
1972): “now the company cares about their (miners’) health… we are more socially 
responsible” (Interview with Hostel Coordinator, Rustenburg 25 May 2005). Yet, despite the 
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directives of the Mining Charter, and pressure from the National Union of Mines (NUM), to 
“upgrade” the hostels to apartments with single rooms and family units, the accommodation 
provided by the mine to lower-ranking employees remains one in which a resident is 
“expected to live as a ‘bachelor… until he returns ‘home’ to visit his wife and children” 
(Ramphele 1993: 20). From the physical space of the hostels, to the involvement of the 
company in the personal lives of mineworkers, the hostel is an encompassing institution 
which circumscribes the interaction between occupants and those outside. The figure of the 
hostel manager embodies this merging of public and private. Like most of the hostel 
managers I talked to, Kobus, manager of Hostel A (one of Anglo Platinum’s Rustenburg 
hostels), spoke about his role in terms of affectionate paternalism—a combination of welfare 
managerialism and discipline. He described his commitment to “protect his men,” and his 
efforts to “educate those who aren’t infected” and to “look after those who are.” He added, 
“we want to make it clear that we will take care of people and they shouldn’t go to the 
informal settlements where it’s not safe.” (Conversation with Kobus Visser, Rustenburg, 19 
May 2005). 
Kobus underlined the awkward role occupied by hostel managers, often conflicted 
between their commitment to residents, and their status as agents of the company’s authority 
over the domestic lives of its employees: “if they don’t go to work that’s not for me to 
interfere… (but) if they’re sick, that’s my concern…you see, I’m working for the company, 
but what I’m doing here is for the residents.”  In this sense, the anachronistic figure of the 
hostel manager embodied a paternalism which was reinvigorated by the imperatives of HIV 
management, yet clashed with the progressive discourse of empowerment and self-mastery in 
which the intervention is cast in corporate policy. 
A focal point of the hostel’s welfare regime was food, and the adoption of the 
“Palladium Public Health Module”, a scientific nutrition system targeted at “maintaining and 
extending the wellness of HIV positive employees” (Anglo Platinum 2003c: 2). Over lunch in 
the hostel canteen, Kobus explained the care that was taken to ensure a precisely balanced 
daily meal for mineworkers. In addition to the scientifically formulated diet, before going on 
shift each day, residents are given Morvite, a vitamin-supplemented porridge. This concern 
with the nutritional sustenance of mineworkers—and its relationship to HIV and employee 
performance—was a central topic for the monthly hostel managers’ meetings where 
discussion focused on what was referred to as “correct feeding procedures.” At the May 
meeting, for example, a manager commented: “the other day I was sitting with the unions and 
they were complaining that the food in the hostels was inadequate for people with HIV... but 
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what about the squatter camps? Are they complaining about the food people eat there?” 
Steyn, the coordinator, replied: “we can track the food groups and check they’re eating right 
in the hostels. If they live in the informal settlements we can’t feed them well.” The contrast 
between the hostels, cast as a healthy environment in which employees are “looked after”, 
and the informal settlements was constantly reinforced. Bruno, another hostel manager, was 
concerned that residents were likely selling their portions of Morvite: “I’ve seen kids running 
around the squatter camps with… Morvite—where else could they be getting them from? 
This means that I have men in the hostel… that aren’t getting their supplements and it’s 
costing us money.”  Steyn put up the most recent cost and nutritional analyses of “feeding 
returns” at each hostel, noting that at Hostel B the proteins were lower: “you should be giving 
them 270 and you’re only giving them 257.” Jurie, Hostel B’s manager, explained that his 
“feeding budget” was inadequate to meeting the new nutritional requirements of Palladium. 
Steyn responded that the budgets were calculated precisely according to the number of hostel 
residents: “if some of those living in the informal settlements are coming in with someone 
else’s card, then you’re over-spending on feeding them instead of getting the nutrition up for 
the residents.” (Hostel Managers Meeting, Rustenburg Mines, 25 May 2005).  
The focus on feeding as part of the broader HIV wellness program encapsulates the 
synergy of scientific workforce management, enlightened self-interest, and the notion of the 
caring corporation that are wrapped up in CSR. At the same time, the legacy of colonial 
paternalism persists within this contemporary approach to HIV management, most explicitly 
in the linking of feeding regimes to productivity. The discussions surrounding Palladium 
recall the colonial administration’s preoccupation with nutrition and labor efficiency 
documented in Fred Cooper’s account of the Mombasa docks in the 1940s: 
The committee looked at how many pounds of maize meal, salt, beans, and meat the 
Railway and the Public Works Department gave their workers; the Government 
Biochemist said this was not enough, and the “Biochemist’s Diet” entered the lexicon 
of scientific wage determination (Cooper 1987: 65). 
Just as Steyn and his colleagues were concerned that mineworkers who live outside the 
hostels would not “feed themselves properly,” so Cooper notes that the 1942 committee on 
malnutrition and industry reported that the diets of dock workers “do not provide the 
resistance to disease and the essential alertness which Government should expect from its 
servants” (quoted in Cooper 1987: 60). 
The imperative to encourage mineworkers to stay in the hostels (and out of the 
informal settlements) similarly provided the rationale for the promotion of sport. And once 
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again, these discussions recall the paternalistic ideals of Victorian industrialists and their 
prescriptions for the moral upliftment of their workers through physical endeavor, 
underpinned by a vision of muscular Christianity. At the Rustenburg mines it was the job of 
the Welfare Officers to promote and organize sports in the hostels, and who, as a 
consequence, were the subject of debate at the hostel meeting: 
Bruno: In the new system, the welfare officers have been demoted to level 5—
you can’t do that to these guys… They’re working really hard to look 
after the men… Otherwise, what are they all going to do? Spend all 
their time in the squatter camps? 
Steyn:  Look, 90 percent of the soccer is contractors and I don’t see the need 
for Anglo Platinum to spend the money to do the soccer for contractors 
that aren’t Anglo Platinum…I want to see figures—how much is he 
[the welfare officer] costing the hostel? ... How many men is he 
recruiting to sports?  
(Hostel Managers Meeting, Rustenburg Mines, 25 May 2005).  
As Steyn’s final comment highlights, there was a sense in which everything targeted at 
managing HIV was, at least in theory, was calculable. Inputs (such as “feeding returns,” the 
number of residents recruited to football, or the number of free condoms given out each 
month) were weighed against outputs, measured by the HIV prevalence rate, the numbers of 
employees in VCT, and on ART. Circle of Hope guidelines instructed that “peer educators 
must keep good records…statistics should include the number of people reached, the number 
of condoms distributed? (Anglo Platinum 2003a: 39). Benjamin, an underground 
mineworker, peer-educator, and Hostel A’s champion long-distance runner, told me: “I think 
the message is getting through, last month we gave out 18,000 condoms… in the hostel in 
just one month.”  These measurements recorded by peer-educators, VCT counsellors and the 
mine medical staff, and reported to corporate HQ, feed into broader analyses of the cost 
benefit of HIV management, demonstrating the capital saved in increased productivity.  
As Kobus took me around his hostel, he stressed the commitment to cleanliness 
throughout the institution. In the spotless industrial kitchen, he said: “we don’t have… 
infections here, it’s kept very, very clean... The hostels are not the way they used to be—
squalid… bad food. Now it’s all sanitary, it’s clean…it’s a healthy place to live” 
(conversation with Kobus Visser, 23 March 2005). The focus on cleanliness seemed symbolic 
of a broader concern for maintaining the purity of the hostel from pollution of all kinds: from 
the risk of food contamination and infections, to the threat of contagion from proximity to the 
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informal settlements. The extension of responsibility over the physical and moral vitality of 
the hostel erected a figurative cordon sanitaire encircling the compound as an independent 
welfare community. Implicit within this vision is an imperative to protect or defend the 
company’s workforce from the potential moral and physical corruption that surrounds the 
territory of the mine. Thus Benjamin explained to me that the gate security measures were: 
“to keep illegal people out and keep the people inside safe because there’s a lot of risks 
outside in the squatter camps—there is a lot of HIV.” (Conversation with Benjamin, Peer-
Educator, Hostel A, 2 April 2005).  
Thus while the extension of the company over the domestic realm for inhabitants of 
the hostels blurred the boundaries between public and personal life, the mechanisms of HIV 
management simultaneously serve to sharpen other social boundaries. As Schoepf argues, “a 
major social fault line is drawn between people of high moral repute and stigmatized 
‘others’... represented as bringing sickness—constructed as social pollution” (Schoepf 2001: 
344).  The practices of HIV containment at the mines re-draw these social fault lines in a bid 
to protect the moral fabric of the mine and its workforce as insiders, from the social pollution 
and physical infection brought by outsiders.  An article in Anglo American’s journal Optima 
describes an influx of squatters bringing ‘crime, disease and prostitution’ to mining areas 
(Russell-Walling 2006: 51).  Similarly, a union shop steward spoke of the need to protect 
mineworkers from “becoming victims of the prostitutes in the squatter camps” (interview, 
Trent Shaft, Rustenburg Mines, 19 May 2005). Once again, the dominant discourse of HIV 
management at the mines recalls colonial attempts to classify, stratify, and segregate the 
working population from the non-working population in order to protect the former group 
from the social contagion and lawlessness of the latter (Cooper 1987). 
Circle of Hope describes its vision as “thinking beyond boundaries in the fight against 
HIV/AIDS by empowering the infected and affected with faith, care and support” (Anglo 
Platinum 2003a: 2). The moral overtones of this mission connect with the portrayal of the 
company as a vehicle of broad social improvement and compassionate capitalism. At the 
same time, the market logic of “the business case for CSR” strives to reassert the primacy of 
shareholder value (and clearly delineated boundaries to corporate care). The logic of CSR 
presents the interests of the company and those of its employees as one: “the thing about 
AIDS is it teaches you the value of humans and human capital. A good response to AIDS is 
synonymous with good management and good management is good business and good 
business is one to invest in” (Interview with Chief Medical Officer, Anglo American 
Johannesburg, 2 May 2005). But there is a fundamental contradiction between valuing 
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humans and valuing human capital. The logic of enlightened self-interest casts labor as a 
facet of production, conflating social responsibility with the desire to maintain productive 
efficiency and thus glossing the tension between them. By framing ART as a benefit, 
provided free of charge by the company to its employees, a perception is generated that, as 
Toby Zwick of the Chamber of Mines put it, “I am being looked after and I am apparently 
not paying for it.” 
 
Responsibility and Externalization 
Circle of Hope’s HIV prevention plan set out to map the “community,” beyond the 
perimeter fence through a “sexually transmitted infection surveillance programme” within a 
10km distance. The aim was to create an economic risk profile of the pandemic, by targeting 
“female commercial sex workers (and) female partners of male attendees” (Anglo Platinum 
2003b: 16). The map depicts the hostels at the centre, surrounded by informal settlements 
marked “high risk areas for transmission for STIs” and “divided into discrete, manageable 
zones” (ibid). The desire for sharp boundaries (arguably a product of the cartographic 
tendencies of an extractive company) cleanses this map of the intricate social relations that 
straddle the workplace and the informal settlements. 
As Scott observes, the process of demarcation, classification, and rationalization not 
only enables the state and, in this case the company, to “get a handle on its subjects” (Scott 
1998: 2), but also to “remake” social realities in its image. The great advantage of such tunnel 
vision is that it brings into sharp focus specific elements of a “far more complex and 
unwieldy reality”; making it amenable to control, and isolating the “slice of social life” that is 
of interest to the observer, in this case, Anglo Platinum (Scott 1998: 11). It does so by aiming 
its interventions at particular targets; making them distinct from those who are not in its line 
of vision or interest; and thereby territorializing the company’s responsibility. And yet, in 
spite of the mapping, profiling, and routine surveillance, the corporate panopticon is limited 
in its capacity both to see and organize the workforce and to insulate it from so-called 
“externalities,” which remain illegible. Cooper tells us that the colonial state strove to 
“preserve the infant urban working class from the contagions of the idle, the criminal, and the 
rural”. But its efforts resulted in a more fragmented workforce, “but not in a purified city” 
(Cooper 1987: 181). The same could be said of the company’s workplace HIV intervention. 
Between 2004 and 2005 the number of hostel residents dropped from 15,885 to 14,928 
(Anglo Platinum 2005: 91). As mineworkers opt to live outside the hostels in increasing 
numbers they move beyond the paternalistic authority of the company, contesting the 
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boundaries that such endeavors have resurrected, and confounding managerial attempts to 
spatialize the responsibility (and indeed authority) within the confines of the workplace.  
Where Cooper (1987) described the capacity of capital to draw a stark divide between 
job and no job, in the post-apartheid workplace that stark divide has become further 
fragmented—riven by inequalities between skilled and unskilled worker, between old and 
young, and between contractor and sub-contractor (Crush et al 2001; Breckenridge 2012). For 
the rise in CSR over the past fifteen odd years and the extension of benefits (largely restricted 
to the permanent employee) has been accompanied by a parallel rise in the use of 
subcontracted labor at the mines. ARTs, together with housing, food and education programs 
are not provided to subcontractors even if they have worked at Anglo, Lonmin, or Impala for 
years. Once reserved primarily for the temporary work of shaft-sinking, subcontractors now 
constitute around 1/3 of the workforce at most of the platinum mines. At Lonmin for 
example, subcontractors accounted for 9,131 of a total workforce of 33,046 (Benchmarks 
Foundation 2012: 72). Equally, while Anglo Platinum drastically reduced its use of 
subcontractors from 14,014 in 2009 to 5,513 in 2012, this may well reflect (and therefore 
veil) mass retrenchments at the Anglo Platinum mines in the wake of the financial crisis in 
2009-2010 (Benchmarks Foundation 2012: 45). What such increases highlight, then, is 
something new: the capacity of corporate managerialism to create fresh inequities alongside 
the old within the lower ranks of the mining workforce and their dependents.   
Employees who voluntarily subscribe to the company’s Platinum Health Insurance 
scheme receive benefits (including ART) for their spouses. But few can afford to do so. Dr. 
McAllister estimated the number of subscriptions as “at most 5000 out of 25,000 and… most 
of those will be in the higher grades.” The company’s 2006 Report to Society stated that, “the 
majority of employees choose to rely on the national health system for the health care of their 
families” (emphasis added). But the report goes on to acknowledge that this source of health 
care is, in reality, unreliable. “Although ART is available in this setting, waiting times are 
long and service provision is patchy” (Anglo American 2006: 27). Clara Xorile, a 
psychologist at Rustenburg mines, suggested this was not a matter of choice: the cost was 
prohibitive for most miners, while the scheme failed to acknowledge the physical distance 
between migrants and their families who are excluded from the mine’s welfare community.  
This makes the demarcation of corporate responsibility easier: “for many their (the miners’) 
wives are in the rural areas so we don’t even come into contact with them” (Interview, 
Rustenburg, 9 April 2005).  
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The exclusionary gaze of the company on its human capital, thus rendered the 
dependents of mineworkers invisible to the exercise of CSR, even where it extends into the 
intimate realm of personal relations and sexuality. However it is not purely, nor chiefly, the 
geographical distance that facilitates this displacement of the social responsibilities and costs 
of the mining industry onto poor rural households, and enables this century-long denial of the 
social worlds of migrant miners beyond the hostel. In many cases the separation between 
mineworkers and their dependents is not marked by physical distance. Where dependents live 
in the informal settlements just outside the hostels they remain equally outside the figurative 
boundary of responsibility that conforms to the contours of the perimeter fence. In 2008 the 
company announced its intention to extend ART to dependents (Anglo American 2008: 30). 
This poses a major practical challenge in relation to tracking dependents back to so-called 
“remote areas” (ibid), highlighting the geographical and discursive border between the 
company and the world outside. It also raises questions about who the company will 
categorise as dependents, and whether this will incorporate or further marginalize those who 
live close by in the informal settlements, but who subvert the classic profile of the migrant 
miner’s rural home life. 
At its most basic level, the reality that is expunged from this corporate vision is 
migrancy itself embodied in the figure of the rock driller. Rock drillers, who make up the 
bulk of the underground workforce, are the lowest rank of the industry’s Patterson salary 
scale. They are the ones literally at the platinum face, drilling into the unpredictable seams 
where they face the immediate threat of rock falls and injury, the short-term health risks of 
TB, which is perfectly incubated in the humid conditions underground, and the long-term 
health risks of silicosis. Deemed an anachronism, a vestige of the old South Africa who do 
not fit the storyline of the new South Africa they have been all but excised from the 
hegemonic narrative of empowered entrepreneurial citizens pursuing the dream of upward 
mobility. In its effort to demarcate zones of protection and wellness, the spatialization of 
corporate care stands in stark contrast to the constant peril and exposure to ill health that 
defines the working life of miners, and rock drillers in particular (Phakathi 2013). Within this 
meta-narrative of denial, the material reality of migrant life continues to be externalized from 
the framework of CSR, and the simple fact (which remains unacknowledged by the mines’ 
housing services) that if a miner is supporting a family in the Eastern Cape or Lesotho the 
living out allowance of around R1,800 is barely enough to rent a shack in the squatter camps. 
This is especially the case in and around Rustenburg where the platinum boom in the early 
2000s led to massive appreciation in the property market and a substantial shortage of low-
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cost housing: “If you live outside the hostels you get the living out allowance, which means 
you cannot afford to live anywhere but the informal settlements….It’s not a choice, either the 
shack or the hostel” (Conversation with Prosper Masinga, NUM shop steward, Rustenburg 
Mines, 19 May 2005).  Rather than a mark of progressive corporate responsibility and 
commitment to the autonomy of employers, the living out allowance is itself an act of 
profound externalization: 
In the past the mine would supply a concrete “bed” and meals. Workers could send 
home to the rural areas most of their pay… [Now] on our small wages we have to pay 
for our own beds and meals. Many workers now have two families here and back 
home (union shop steward, quoted in Mapaila 2012). 
As increasing aspects of social welfare are dispensed by non-state entities through 
exclusionary and narrowly targeted processes of corporate care to specific constituencies, it is 
not purely capital that can be credited with creating such fragmentation and inequity. It is the 
administration of welfare itself that serves to divide and rule. The outcome is two mutually 
dependent yet seemingly antithetical dimensions of the janus-faced corporate form—the one 
asserting responsibility for worker care and welfare in the very same moment that the other 
externalizes it. In the former we see a corporate paternalism over the company’s direct human 
capital (i.e. its permanent workforce) reminiscent of colonial and apartheid regimes of total 
control. In the latter we see, the benefits extended through CSR to be highly exclusionary, 
reserved only for that shrinking portion of the workforce that the corporation claims as its 
own, while rendering subcontractors and dependents, as ineligible.  
 
Temporalities of Care: “A Handover to Nothing” 
The big question now is, what do you do with workers who leave your employment or 
you have to get rid of for other reasons? (Interview with Chris Carrick, Anglo 
American executive, London 9 August 2004). 
The geographic dislocation of responsibility described above alerts us equally to the short-
term and contingent nature of corporate care, as the spatial dynamics of externalization 
intersect with temporal dynamics. In 2005, the wellness program was, according to Dr. 
McAllister, “relatively cheap” at about R300 per person per month3. This was in part because 
two thirds of the medical costs of HIV are incurred in “the final illness” and, McAllister 
explained, most will have been “sent home by then” (Interview with Dr McAllister, Anglo 
Platinum Rustenburg Hospital 25 April 2005). The wellness programme was provided to 
mineworkers for as long as they were employed at the company. If they were retrenched, 
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assessed unfit for work due to illness, or left, they were given three months of ART and then 
handed over to the state service. The Anglo American 2006 Report to Society states, “we 
strive to ensure that individuals leaving our employment continue their treatment through 
other programmes” (Anglo American 2006: 27). Zuneid Moosa, a doctor at the Platinum 
Health Hospital in Rustenburg, explained: 
We provide ART for as long as they’re improving and are fit for work, and 95 percent 
of those on ART are healthy and back at work. But once they’ve plateaued, those who 
aren’t well enough to work get medically boarded, dismissed, and passed on to the 
government health providers. (Conversation with Dr Moosa, Rustenburg, 3 March 
2005).  
Anglo Platinum sets out this process as formal protocol, “Progression Towards AIDS: Step 3: 
Creation of an Interface between Anglo Platinum and Labour Sending Areas:” 
Where employees do not meet the required level of performance or attendance, as 
determined by the company, and exceed the sick leave allocation, employees will be 
referred to the company designated medical officer. The medical officer will 
confidentially discuss and determine the contents of the medical examination... An 
opinion will be provided to the company as regards to the employees [sic] prognosis 
and ability to fulfil the job requirements. If the employee is declared to be 
permanently unfit to work, with no possibility of rehabilitation, the HR manager will 
investigate the viability to invoke the procedures and principles of dismissal because 
of incapacity in terms of the Labour Relations Act 1995, Act 66 of 1955... A 
medically repatriated employee will not be able to access the workplace care and 
support programme. Anglo Platinum will commit to follow up the cases for a period 
of six months to ensure that the employee has made a smooth transition into the 
community care… system within the labour sending area (Anglo Platinum 2003c: 9, 
emphasis added). 
Despite the focus on creating an “interface” between the “services offered in the 
workplace environment” and “the community environment” (ibid: 4), the transition from 
company employee to “repatriated employee” represents a boundary. The consensus among 
the company’s ART coordinators in Rustenburg was that once a mineworker had left the 
company, hope of a “continuum of care” (Anglo Platinum 2003a: 58) was at best highly 
optimistic. Martha Lesego, ART coordinating nurse at Anglo Platinum’s Rustenburg hospital 
commented that: 
If a person gets medically boarded the company will support them with ART for  
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three months and then transfer them to the government stream… As you are  
aware the government is not yet very far along with their rollout. (Interview, 
Rustenburg, 15 June 2005). 
McAllister was even more explicit about this “hand-over to nothing:”  
When workers leave the employment of the mine we write a very nice letter detailing 
the status of the patient, his CD-4 Count … “this person is on such and such a 
combination”… and it goes to a sister in a little rural clinic in the Eastern Cape… and 
then it stops. It’s a hand-over to nothing. 
With the high turnover of staff in the lower grades of mine employment (one shaft manager 
put it close to 100 percent turnover in five years), the hope, according to McAllister, is that 
“sometimes treatment will be picked up by other work places if they’ve moved jobs. Unless 
of course they’re too sick to work,” he added. There is little doubt that in the context of the 
current economic downturn, that few retrenched Anglo employees will be in a position to 
find a permanent job at another mining company that offers the benefits of a workplace HIV 
wellness program, making the chance of a “continuum of care” slim at best. 
Yet, while most of the mine’s medical staff acknowledged the difficulties of ensuring 
uninterrupted compliance to a drug regime, given job insecurity in the mining industry, few 
spoke explicitly about the concerns this raised for multi-drug resistance. Concern was 
however expressed by Gilbert Mogapi, an Anglo Platinum socio-economic development 
officer at the Rustenburg mines: 
Once it is rolled out, the service cannot be interrupted. Once you start with ART you 
can’t discontinue it, if you come off it for a month, you cannot go back on because of 
the danger of multi-drug resistant strains. Even in places where the rollout is the most 
advanced, like in Gauteng or the Western Cape, you might wait 6 months on a list. In 
rural areas in the Eastern Cape, it’s virtually non-existent.  
Dr. van Zyl dismissed such fears. It was precisely the expectation that (in spite of the 
company’s efforts) few employees would in fact find treatment elsewhere after leaving the 
Anglo care program that allayed concerns about multi-drug resistance: 
If you have a quick, clean cut then it’ll be ok. If you completely suppress it, it’s fine, 
and if you don’t suppress it at all, it’s fine—well not for them—but fine in terms of 
mutant strains. It’s if you partially suppress it, or come off and on sporadically, that 
you get escaped mutants and that has severe epidemiological consequences. Also 
remember that, at this point, the number of people in the company on ART is still 
pretty small because VCT uptake has been slow. 
  
21 
A number of issues emerge in light of van Zyl’s observations. He was firm on the 
company’s policy to mitigate the risk of multi-drug resistance by demanding either full 
compliance or complete termination of treatment because of the “serious epidemiological 
consequences” of partial suppression or sporadic treatment. At the same time, he, like 
McAllister, had made it clear that the likelihood that workers who were dismissed would find 
alternative sources of ART was at best unpredictable, and thus there was no way of knowing 
the treatment regimen of former employees would be once they left the Anglo medical 
system. Van Zyl further suggested that the risk of multi-drug resistance was minimized, as 
the cohort of Anglo Platinum workers on ART was “still pretty small.” However the 
commitment to increasing participation in VCT and enrolment in the wellness program 
demonstrates the hope that numbers would grow significantly over the coming years. As 
Farmer argues multi-drug resistance should be viewed as the product of particular political 
and social relations (Farmer 1997: 348). In this case, fears of multi-drug resistance are 
revealing of the limits of corporate care, and the disjuncture between a corporate HIV 
intervention and state provision. This challenges the dominant projection of the company’s 
HIV intervention as a moral and political stand against the ineptitude of government. In 
practice, the corporate care program reflects instead the particular interests of the company: 
to maintain worker health as long as employees are within the spatial confines of the 
workplace, the structural confines of the Anglo system, and, crucially, as long as they are 
economically productive. 
The enduring terminology of mineworker “repatriation,” in both official company 
HIV policy and in the everyday discourse of medical personnel and hostel managers, was 
striking: an artefact of colonial and apartheid-era labor regimes that endured during the 
course of almost a century. Yet, apartheid-era “influx controls,” which restricted the 
movement of black workers between the dually constructed worlds of “homeland” and 
workplace were dismantled almost thirty years ago. Still, the discursive separation of the 
mine from broader society remains a significant element in understanding how contemporary 
discourses of HIV management at the mines reinscribe spatial, moral, and political 
boundaries between the workplace and society.  
 
Conclusion: Expectations of Paternalism 
Despite (or perhaps because of) its emphasis on scenario forecasting, Anglo Platinum’s future 
vision of worker care is myopic. For it is premised on a denial or obfuscation of the effects of 
corporate welfare dispensation beyond the workplace; outcomes that may be deferred by CSR, 
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but become all the more inevitable. In the end, this brings home how perilous and 
exclusionary this new social-moral contract is, premised as it is on corporate patronage that is 
simultaneously coercive and fickle, for it can be extended or withdrawn at will (Rajak 2011).  
This was captured in the most visceral way in the aftermath of the Marikana Massacre of 34 
striking rock drillers on the platinum belt in 2012 and the wave of strikes that paralyzed the 
industry following the killings. In the second year of the strikes, in a bid to get rock drillers 
back to work, Anglo American closed the hostel kitchens where a great many miners, even 
those who do not live in the hostels, survive on one meal a day. This single act brought into 
sharp focus the violence of corporate responsibility as an instrument of benevolent tyranny (or 
tyrannical benevolence?) that enables companies to give and withhold benefits as techniques 
of control used in undermining worker agency. The Marikana Massacre and its aftermath has 
reaffirmed that CSR has the peculiar capacity to dehumanize even as it claims an ethic of care. 
This form of corporate welfare turns humans into human capital, a productive resource to be 
nurtured, controlled or repressed through the provision or withholding of even the most basic 
welfare and social goods, in this case food.  
At the same time, Marikana has come to symbolize not only the struggle for 
recognition by the country’s disenfranchised miners, but a much broader struggle by 
underpaid and marginalized workers in other sectors such as agriculture, by subcontractors at 
the mercy of flexible contracts and ruthless labour brokers, by the jobless inhabitants of 
squatter camps who live on the fringes of mine territories. The predicament of those who 
have lived in a state of chronic impermanence has, quite paradoxically, come to permanently 
define the “new” South Africa for many millions of its citizens (James 2011). The protests 
around the platinum mines brought together subcontractors, rock-drillers, and squatters alike 
in ways that defy corporate processes of divide and rule chronicled in this essay, creating new 
solidarities in collective demands for jobs for the jobless, and fairer wages for the poorest 
workers, for protection and security.  
Such petitions for a renewal of corporate paternalism may seem anachronistic—
recalling in part the Thompsonian moral economy of the English peasantry seeking protection 
from their overlords against the ravages of the market (Thompson 1991) - but they are quite 
distinct. The expectations of paternalism which have come to define the politics of protest at 
South Africa’s mines over the past few years, have done so in the wake of the global 
economic crisis, as the only recourse left for claim-making from below4.  They reveal change 
as much as continuity in the corporate dispensation of welfare in South African’s mining 
territories. For while the practices of corporate-sponsored welfare reinvigorate century-old 
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forms of patronage and clientelism both on and around the mines (Moodie 1994; Carstens 
2001), they are now both more exclusive and more contingent than the total and 
comprehensive paternalism once so characteristic of the Southern African minescape. 
As James Ferguson makes clear, such “declarations of dependence”—which in this 
case look to the self-styled corporate sponsors of welfare and empowerment rather than the 
state—should be seen as an activist mode of claim-making, rather than a “retrograde yearning 
for paternalism” (Ferguson 2013: 223). After all, if corporations such as Anglo are to be 
taken seriously in their declarations of corporate social responsibility, it stands to reason that 
workers (as well as those who live tantalizingly close to the benefits extended through CSR) 
must try to compel companies to make good on their promise to take care of them, by 
whatever means they can. 
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